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Lorna Gillies * 
ABSTRACT 
The Communitarisation of choice of law rules for non-contractual obligations is the 
most recent illustration of Treaty objectives in promoting the compatibility of choice 
of law and jurisdiction rules between the Member States. On 11 January 2009, with 
the exception of Denmark, Regulation No 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations (hereafter the Rome II Regulation) came into force across the 
Community. The Regulation provides freedom for the parties to select the applicable 
law governing a ‘non-contractual obligation’ that falls within the scope of the 
Regulation. In addition to the general choice of law rule, the Regulation also provides 
specific choice of law rules for torts and delicts arising out of (inter alia) unfair 
competition and acts restricting free competition.  The aim of these rules is to 
determine the applicable law for consumers or their representatives to claim damages 
for breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex Articles 81 and 82) as a result of cross-
border anti-competitive business activities. More recently, the European Commission 
has also released a Green Paper on Collective Consumer Redress (COM (2008) 794 
Final) which proposes a Community collective redress mechanism to operate between 
the Member States for the resolution of consumers’ claims. After briefly outlining the 
general approach of the Rome II Regulation, the paper explores the specific choice of 
law rules for the torts of unfair competition under Article 6(1) and acts restricting 
competition under Article 6(3). Having identified the key concepts and challenges that 
may arise for consumers and their representatives with the application of these new 
applicable law rules, the paper will consider to what extent the proposed EU 
Consumer Collective Redress mechanism could further enhance the ability of 
consumers to claim damages against businesses that undertake anti-competitive 
practices in breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU (ex Article 81 or 82 EC) to the 
detriment of consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The last five years have witnessed a decrease in the parallelism between EU 
competition and consumer law policies. Recent policy and legislative developments in 
these politically distinct areas of EU law highlight that effective consumer protection 
and redress  - where it does not currently exist at the level of Member States - will 
increasingly rely upon effective regulation or enforcement of anti-competitive 
business practices via EU competition law.1 Indeed Recital 7 of Regulation EC 
1/2003 requires Member States to ensure that private individuals can pursue private 
redress mechanisms via national courts. Consequently, the increasing prevalence of 
private enforcement – namely private claims for damages - as a means of regulating 
market activity and enhancing consumer protection between the Member States 
necessitates reference to Community rules on private international law. 2 In 2002, 
Withers commented that the ‘cause of action [for a claim in tort for breach of 
competition law] is very much at an incipient stage of development.’ 3 The same 
could be said for analogous rules of private international law. Indeed, at the time 
Withers’ valuable analysis of jurisdiction and applicable law rules alluded to the need 
for many other significant ‘additional procedural and evidential issues’ 4 to be 
addressed to ensure the effectiveness of private enforcement as a remedy for victims 
of anti-competitive behaviour.  Nevertheless, in accordance with Treaty obligations, 
the EC has continued to implement measures designed to facilitate private 
enforcement of competition laws. Furthermore it has also continued to implement 
measures pursuant to judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. 5 The most 
recent development connecting both measures is Regulation EC 864/2007 on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations 6 (hereafter the Rome II Regulation) 
                                                 
1 For example, Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 16 December 2002, OJ 2002 L1/1 (04.01.2003). 
2 C. Withers, ‘Jurisdiction and applicable law in antitrust tort claims’, (May) Journal of Business Law 
(2002) 250 ; B. Rodger, ‘Private enforcement and the Enterprise Act:  an exemplary system of 
awarding damages?’ 24(3) European Competition Law Review (2003) 103, pp.103-104 ; D. Fairgreave 
and G. Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures – European Debates’,  58(2) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2009) 379, p.381. 
3 Withers, note 2 ibid. Words added for syntax. 
4 Withers, note 2 ibid, p.255 ; see further in response Rodger, note 2 ibid. 
5Article 81 (ex Article 65), TFEU. 
6 ‘Regulation EC 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations,’ (hereafter the 
‘Rome II Regulation’) OJ 2007 L199/40. 
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which provides rules to determine the applicable law of a non-contractual obligation. 
A key development offered by this new, communitarised private international law 
instrument is contained in Article 6. Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation determines 
the applicable law that will apply when private, final consumers or their 
representatives claim damages against businesses for anti-competitive practices or 
acts which have restricted competition, thereby impeding consumer choice. 
 
The protection afforded to consumers by EU competition law can be distinguished by 
the duty owed to consumers,7 the nature of the enforcement mechanism pursued 
(public or private), the type of the remedy sought (predominantly injunctions) and the 
location of the parties (whether domiciled or situated in the same or different 
jurisdictions). In general throughout the EU, public enforcement has been a - if not 
‘the’- prevalent redress mechanism, whether by way of proceedings pursued by the 
Commission 8 or by the individual Member States themselves. On the other hand, 
private enforcement of competition law has traditionally been limited to injunctive 
relief. 9 Such a remedy is premised on objective of deterring businesses from acting in 
an anti-competitive manner either against their competitors or to protect private, end-
user consumers.  10 Breach of either Articles 101 or 102 TFEU 11 (ex Articles 81 or 82 
EC) also permits such victims of anti-competitive behaviour to claim damages. Whilst 
the ability to claim damages will invariably also deter businesses contemplating anti-
competitive practices, the purpose of damages in such instances is to provide 
‘victims’ (essentially businesses or consumers) with compensation. 12 As far as 
private, final consumers are concerned, the ability to claim damages should provide 
                                                 
7 Whether owed by the Member State or a business operating in the market. 
8 J. Fitchen, ‘Choice of Law in International Claims Based on Restrictions of Competition: Article 6(3) 
of the Rome II Regulation’, 5(2) Journal of Private International Law (2009) 337 at p.338. See also 
specifically on Article 6(3), Elena Rodriguez Pineau, ‘Conflict of Laws Comes to the Rescue of 
Competition Law: the New Rome II Regulation’, 5(2) Journal of Private International Law (2009) 
311. 
9 ‘Regulation EC 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of  27 October 2004 on Cooperation Between National Authorities Responsible for The Enforcement 
of Consumer Protection Laws (The Regulation On Consumer Protection Cooperation)’,  OJ 2004 
L364/1 ; C.A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law, (OUP, 1999). 
10 For example, the recent codified ‘Directive 2009/22/EC on Injunctions for the Protection of 
Consumers’ Interests,’ OJ 2009 L110/30. 
11 Both numberings will be provided. 
12 It is acknowledged that the definition of victim is developing as this area of law develops: see further 
on this Fitchen, note 8 supra. 
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them with increased protection against unscrupulous businesses and the effect of their 
commercial activities on the marketplace. 13  
 
First, it is necessary to consider what constitutes anti-competitive behaviour or 
business structures that have a detrimental effect on consumers in the marketplace. At 
this stage, it is worthy to clarify the meaning of consumer. The prohibitions against 
anti-competitive behaviour or abuse of a dominant position in Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU (ex Articles 81 and 82 EC) traditionally applied to ‘any user.’ 14 The Articles in 
the most recent version of the Treaty refer in the majority to the effect of anti-
competitive behaviour upon ‘trading parties.’ 15 Consumers are referred to in the 
context of such behaviour being permissible when it would be deemed to be ‘fair’ 16 
to them, for example by improving competition and reducing prices. However, for the 
purposes of this paper, it is necessary to focus on the protection to be given to the 
consumers in the ‘restricted’ 17 sense. The restricted meaning of consumer applies in 
other recently enacted Community rules of private international law, including Article 
15 of the Brussels I Regulation (on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters) and 
Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation (on the law applicable to contractual obligations). 
In  accordance with Recital 21 of the Rome II Regulation, ‘the conflict-of-law rule 
should protect competitors, consumers and the general public …’ 18 The Rome II 
Regulation therefore distinguishes between other competitor businesses and 
consumers as private individuals (as well as the market as a whole). It would be fair to 
say that economic behaviour either horizontally between competitors or vertically 
between suppliers and competitors ‘damage(s) […] the consumer interest’ 19 as a 
result of price fixing arrangements / cartels which have the effect of limiting 
production in the marketplace ‘to the prejudice of the consumer’ 20 or ancillary 
conditions being imposed in contracts with consumers (for example, requiring 
consumers to enter into insurance or warranty agreements for the purchase of 
                                                 
13 Withers, note 2 supra, p.271. 
14 G. Howells and S. Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law, 2nd ed, (Ashgate, 2005), p.533. 
15 Article 101(1) TFEU. 
16 Article 101(3) TFEU (ex Article 81(3)). 
17 C-89/91 Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB [1993] ECR 1-139. 
18 Rome II Regulation, Recital 21. Itallics added for emphasis. The French language version refers to 
‘consommateurs.’ 
19 Howells and Weatherill, note 14 supra, p.528. Words modified and removed for syntax. 
20 Article 82 EC, observed by Howells and Weatherill as a ‘rare explicit reference [in the Treaty] to the 
position of the consumer’ ; ibid, pp.549-50. Words added for syntax. 
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particular goods). Consumers may also be adversely affected by economic structures 
imposed by business activities such as monopolies and mergers. Such activities may 
constitute unfair commercial practices against consumers in the marketplace. Second, 
it is necessary to consider where the parties are territorially located in order to 
determine the extent of business liability for breach of competition laws. The location 
of the parties is significant as far as competition law is concerned for, as Withers 
reminds us, ‘(E)ach […] legal system […] establishes a regime for the protection of 
effective competition […] within their territorial jurisdiction.’ 21 In accordance with 
Courage, such regimes are at the behest of ‘safeguarding [individual] rights’ 22 under 
EU competition law. Depending on where the parties are located, consumers may be 
exposed to anti-competitive behaviour either in the same Member State as the 
business or between Member States. It is the latter situation which this paper is 
concerned. As technology continues to identify new consumer markets and 
competitors located in different Member States (and indeed beyond), the EU has 
recognised that the potential for cross-border anti-competitive practices has increased. 
EU competition policy aims to provide a coherent and consistent approach to the 
regulation of business activities and enforcement of competition laws for businesses 
operating in markets within and between the Member States. Until recent initiatives 
for the review of the consumer acquis, 23 the same could not be said for consumer 
protection policy in the EU. The ‘maximisation’ 24 of consumer protection policy is 
now being pursued via proposals for, inter alia, a draft Directive on Consumer 
Rights25 and an EU Consumer Collective Redress mechanism.26 When infringements 
of competition laws occur, different methods of enforcement or redress can be 
pursued depending on the nature of the breach and the location of the victims 
affected. As Jones attests, clearly defined communitarised rules of private 
international law and appropriate redress mechanisms will be required to facilitate 
                                                 
21 Withers, note 2 ibid. Words removed for syntax. 
22 C-453/99 Courage v Crehan  [2001] ECR I-6297; [2002] QB 502, p.522, 29E. Word added for 
syntax. 
23 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis’,  COM (2006) 744. 
24 Hans W. Micklitz and Norbert Reich, ‘Crónica De Una Muerte Anunciada: The Commission 
Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’,  46(2) Common Market Law Review (2009) 471. 
25 European Parliament and Council, ‘Proposal for a Directive on Consumers Rights’, COM (2008) 614 
final 2008/0196 (COD). 
26 Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress COM (2008) 794 Final 27/11/08. 
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private enforcement as an additional means of redress for breach of competition 
laws.27 
 
Whilst encapsulated in the Treaty, private enforcement of competition law has not 
traditionally been recognised and relied upon as an available (or implicitly preferred) 
option for resolving disputes in comparison to the established rules for anti-trust 
claims in the United States. 28 However in order to safeguard the interests of other 
businesses, competitors and ultimately final consumers in the European marketplace, 
parties who have suffered loss or damage as a result of anti-competitive behaviour 
should be able to utilise (at least in theory) private means of redress via the ability to 
claim damages. In essence, the right is facilitated by the Treaty but the application is 
dependent, given the infancy of competition law, 29 upon measures 30 implemented by 
the Member States. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Enterprise Act 2002 
permits consumer representatives raise bring proceedings on behalf of consumers to 
the Competition Appeals Tribunal. 31 However, when parties are domiciled or located 
in different Member States, or the defendant’s actions result in damage to the plaintiff 
who is situated in another jurisdiction, we have to turn to the rules of private 
international law 32 to determine three key elements. First – assuming the nature of the 
claim and the consumer has title to sue 33- where can the aggrieved party sue (lex 
fori)? Second, once the lex fori has been established, what laws (lex cause) will 
apply? Finally, once a judgment has been obtained from the court, how and where can 
that judgment be recognised and enforced? 34 This paper is concerned with recent 
developments in relation to the second matter – namely Community rules determining 
the applicable law - in the context of private redress for anti-competitive behaviour 
                                                 
27 Jones, note 9 supra, pp. 88-9, 91-2. 
28 On which see Jones, note 9 supra, p.16 and generally ; Withers, note 2 ibid, p.250, 254 et seq ;  
Rodger note 2 ibid, p.103 et seq; Fitchen, note 8 supra, p.338. 
29 Fitchen, note 8 supra, p.340. 
30 Including measures for consumer collective redress: see Fairgreave and Howells, note 2 supra. 
31 Enterprise Act 2002 Part 8. 
32 Acknowledged by Fitchen, note 8 supra who then focuses his analysis of Article 6(3) of Rome II on 
examination on the identity of the victim and the operation of current national remedies in his analysis 
of Article 6(3). 
33 Akin to instituting proceedings for an injunction against a business; H. W. Micklitz, N. Reich, P. 
Rott, Understanding EU Consumer Law, (Intersentia/Hart, Oxford, 2009), p.356. 
34 In the private international law/conflict of laws sense, the term ‘enforcement’ is distinct from the 
‘enforcement’ of (substantive) competition laws. The former is concerned with rules that permit 
enforcement of a judgment from the court of a Member State (or third state) in the courts of another 
Member State. 
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that has caused damage 35 to private, final (end-user) consumers. The new Rome II 
Regulation seeks to facilitate cross-border private enforcement of competition laws by 
stipulating the rules that will determine the applicable law for such claims. In seeking 
to make a (focussed) contribution to the on-going debate on this complex and 
contentious topic, this paper considers the private international law perspective by 
examining the intrinsic value of EU communitarised applicable law rules for non-
contractual obligations. The particular focus of this paper is whether - in the context 
of the private enforcement of/claim for a breach of competition laws when a dispute 
occurs between consumers and businesses situated in different jurisdictions - the 
combination of the applicable law rules in the new Rome II Regulation and the 
proposals for an EU Collective Consumer Redress mechanism can together provide a 
coherent basis for consumers and their representatives to seek damages for anti-
competitive practices.  
 
A number of the key issues and terms in the Rome II Regulation will be considered to 
highlight the practical challenges that consumers and their representatives will be 
required to assess before raising proceedings in the courts of a Member State. Whilst 
the rules may, in theory at least, deter businesses from participating in cross-border 
anti-competitive practices, in practice, the consensus is that the content 36 and current 
lack of guidance on interpreting these new 37 applicable law rules will render it even 
more difficult for consumers and their representatives to pursue claims for damages as 
a means of private enforcement of competition laws. The effective application of 
Article 6 could therefore hinge upon either current collective procedures for private 
enforcement operating in the Member States (where they already exist) 38 or the 
proposed EU-led Consumer Collective Redress Mechanism (if and when it applies, 
and the form it will take). 39 What must be remembered is that despite justified 
concerns vis-a-vis the content and current limitations on the interpretation of Article 6 
of Rome II, the (possibly indirect) deterrent 40 effect of these rules may prevent or 
                                                 
35 cf Article 15, Rome II, on which see M. Danov, ‘Awarding exemplary (or punitive) antitrust 
damages in EC competition cases with an international element - the Rome II Regulation and the 
Commission's White Paper on Damages’,  European Competition Law Review 29(7) (2008) 430. 
36 On which see generally A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations, (OUP, 2008), Chapter 6. 
37 As far as English conflict of laws is concerned. 
38 Rodger, note 2 supra. 
39 Fitchen, note 8 supra, p.338. 
40 Micklitz, Reich and Rott, note 33 supra, p.382. 
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facilitate the resolution of disputes without resorting to court proceedings, thereby 
improving competitive relations between businesses operating amongst the Member 
States for the benefit of all parties and the specifically the protection of consumers. 41 
 
GOING BEYOND COURAGE: ARTICLE 101 AND 102 TFEU AND THE 
COLLECTIVE CONSUMER INTEREST   
According to Howells and Weatherill ‘(C)onsumer policy is a concealed aspect of 
competition policy and vice versa[.]’ 42 The enforcement of competition law operates 
at a number of levels, all of which in theory should be open to a private consumer to 
utilise. 43 At an institutional level, the Commission’s role in ensuring effective 
investigation of suspected infringements of competition law was affirmed in 
Francesconi 44 and BEUC v Commission.45  As Micklitz, Reich and Rott confirm  
 […] the powers have shifted. The Community may be authorised to order 
Community-wide measures and it may be required to comply with the duties 
to protect consumer’s health and safety as set out in Articles 153, 95 and 30 
EC. The Commission becomes increasingly more competent; however, it 
exposes itself to the risk of becoming subject to liability claims. 46 
 
The Court of First Instance in Guerin Automobiles v Commission 47 permitted a 
complaint by an undertaking (Guerin) that ‘had suffered damage as a result of 
restrictive practices [to] rely ... on the rights conferred on it by Articles [81 and 82]  ... 
which produce direct effects in relations between individuals.’ 48 The emphasis 
appears to rest on the exclusivity of power vested in the Commission to investigate 
such allegations.49 At Member State level, the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness place obligations upon Member States to ensure that Community 
competition rules and remedies (in particular damages 50) are implemented for the 
benefit and protection of participants in the EU marketplace. Failure to do so risks the 
prospect of proceedings by private parties. Ever since Courage v Crehan 51 and 
                                                 
41 Micklitz, Reich and Rott, ibid. 
42 Howells and Weatherill, note 14 supra, p.519. Punctuation modified for syntax. 
43 Howells and Weatherill, ibid, p.535. 
44 C326/86 Francesconi [1989] ECR 2087. 
45 T-37/92 BEUC v Commission [1994] ECR II-285. 
46 Micklitz, Reich and Rott, note 33 supra, p.340. 
47
C282/95 Guerin Automobiles v Commission  
48 Guerin Automobiles, ibid at p.39;  Jones, note 9 supra, p.78, words modified for syntax. 
49 T38/96 Guerin Automobiles v Commission [1997] E.C.R. II-1223 at para 25 et seq. 
50 See further Dahnov, note 35 supra ; Fitchen, note 8 supra. 
51 Courage, note 22 supra. 
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Henkel 52 there has been a specific ability (ie. right) of businesses to be able to claim 
damages as a result of a breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU (ex Article 81 or 82). The 
call is illustrative of the triple objective of competition law in protecting the 
marketplace, protecting competitor’s interests and protecting competitors. 
 
More recently, the Commission’s White Paper on Actions for Damages for Breach of 
Anti-Trust Rules 53 proposes that businesses should be able to seek damages against 
competitors for breaches of competition law. Such remedies now extend to 
consumers. As Mickiltz Reich and Rott attest, Member States must ensure that they 
enact and implement EU laws to protect consumers or they will be liable for either a 
failure to act or a failure to properly implement measures 54 and would therefore, as 
Withers confirms, be in breach of their statutory duty under the European 
Communities Act 1972. In terms of how competition law ‘protects’ consumers, the 
distinction can be made to some extent between substantive law and procedure. As 
Jones affirms, ‘ [...] the Community provides the substantive right and the national 
court provides the procedural means of safeguarding that right in the absence of 
Community legislation.’ 55 In accordance with the objectives of Regulation 1/2003 
referred to earlier, it has always been the duty of Member States’ national laws to 
‘protect [...] Community rights under competition rules [...] it is incumbent upon the 
Member States to provide remedies and procedures suitable for the protection of those 
rights.’ 56 The starting point for any claim for anti-competitive behaviour is Articles 
101 and 102 (ex Articles 81 and 82 EC). According to Jones, 
Articles [81 and 82] create directly effective Community rights, and the right 
to damages is a necessary corollary of the principle of direct effect. The right 
of reparation arises equally with respect to loss and damage caused by private 
parties breaching Community law as it does from Member States breaching 
Community law. 57 
 
As a means of regulating the market and compensating victims of anti-competitive 
behaviour, there is clear justification for enabling competitors to pursue private 
damages claims against one another. Not surprisingly, however, there has been very 
                                                 
52 C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Karl Heinz Henkel OJ C192, 08/07/2000, 11. 
53 “Article 82 EC and the White Paper on ‘Actions for breach of the EC anti-trust rules’, COM (2008) 
165. 
54 Micklitz, Reich, Rott, note 33 supra, p.321, 325 ; Withers, note 2 supra, p.252. 
55 Jones, note 9 supra, p.61, words italicised for emphasis. 
56 Articles 3 and 11, Regulation EC 1/2003 ; Jones, ibid, p.60. 
57 Jones, ibid, p.78. 
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limited quantitative evidence as to the ability and success of businesses claiming such 
damages via the courts. A recent study undertaken by Rodger of the position of 
private enforcement in the United Kingdom concluded that such actions (if they arise) 
tend to be resolved or settle out of court. 58 As far as consumers are concerned, two 
questions follow. First, to what extent can consumers benefit from equivalent 
protection? Second, following Wither’s query of the need for a ‘Euro tort,’ 59 to what 
extent it is necessary to have communitarised applicable law rules for such disputes? 
In respect of the first question the ability of consumers, in theory, to claim damages 
against businesses should improve market conditions, deter businesses from 
contemplating ‘unfair commercial practices’ and increase protection for consumers. In 
practice, it is a moot point to what extent the general take-up of private enforcement 
of claims for breach of competition will be by individual consumers – even less so 
when their dispute involves a business located in another Member State. It is 
submitted that the effectiveness of such protection provided by competition law could 
depend upon the enhancing the collective interest of consumers via an EU Collective 
Consumer Redress mechanism. Such mechanisms currently operate to some extent 
across the Member States.60 However, as a consequence of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, the approach is neither widespread nor consistent.61 
The potential for cross-border disputes between consumers and businesses as a result 
of anti-competitive behaviour renders both the applicable law rules governing such 
disputes and consequently the practical ability of consumers to raise such proceedings 
more acute. Therefore as regards the second question, a communitarised approach 
seeks to ensure that consumers in the Member States are provided with consistent, 
maximised protection against businesses operating in other Member States whilst at 
the same time the compatibility of jurisdiction and choice of law rules continue to be 
implemented in accordance with Treaty obligations. 62 Nevertheless, doubts have 
justifiably been raised regarding the basis and terms of Article 6 of the Rome II 
Regulation and - as is the invariable nature of communitarised private international 
                                                 
58 B. Rodger, ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Law, The Hidden Story: Competition Litigation 
Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005’, 29(2) European Competition Law Review (2008) 96-
116, p.97. 
59 Withers, note 2 supra at p.253. 
60 See Fairgreave and Howells, note 2 supra. 
61 Micklitz, Reich and Rott, note 33 supra, p.350, 361-2.  
62 Article 81 TFEU (ex Article 65). 
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law rules - a lack of current guidance from either the Commission or the European 
Court of Justice in defining the key provisions contained in Article 6. 63 
 
Accordingly the rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next part will consider 
how Article 6 determines the applicable law of a non-contractual obligation in a claim 
for damages by consumers or their representatives. The specific aspects of Rome II 
that need to be addressed by the European Court of Justice will be highlighted. The 
third part will consider collective redress traditionally, in terms of the Consumer 
Policy Strategy and the Treaty. The fourth and final part will consider the treaty basis 
and competence for the EU Consumer Collective Redress mechanism of the type 
proposed for consumers. The paper will conclude by considering to what extent such 
a proposal can assist in the practical application of Article 6 of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
 
THE TORT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE POSITION OF 
ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEN AND NOW  
As the next section of this paper will consider, over the course of its inception and 
recent enactment, commentators including Dickinson and Fitchen have justifiably 
questioned the utility of the connecting factors in Article 6 in the Rome II Regulation 
with scepticism. Such views are meritorious. There is a certain novelty, as far as 
private international law is concerned, with applicable law rules for torts of this kind. 
English law has never had specific (in the sense of distinct) choice of law rules per se 
for anti-competitive behaviour or acts restricting competition. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to briefly review how unfair competition previously constituted a tort for 
the purposes of private international law. Both jurisdiction and choice of law rules 
will be briefly considered as the latter is dependent upon the effective classification 
by the forum. The classification of what constitutes a tort for the purposes of private 
international law is dependent significantly upon first which forum has jurisdiction 
over the dispute and second the approach taken by the forum in classifying the tort in 
                                                 
63 Dickinson, note 36 supra and Fitchen, note 8 supra. 
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question. 64 It is worthy to remember that the process of classification must be 
undertaken by the forum, 65  meaning that the ‘cause of action’ must have been 
capable of being recognised as a tort in itself 66 by the forum for the ‘purposes of 
private international law.’ 67  
 
It is necessary to determine where the defendant is situated before the English courts 
can assume jurisdiction, either via the ‘traditional rules’ or the ‘Brussels I Regime’. 
The outcome is the same – if the English court has jurisdiction, English law will apply 
as the lex fori to any claim for damages as a result of a tort. If the defendant business 
is not situated in a Member State, Section IV of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Part B, 
Paragraph 6.36(9) 68 applies where ‘(a) damage was sustained in within the 
jurisdiction; or (b) the damage sustained resulted from an act committed within the 
jurisdiction.’ It is possible for the defendant business to argue that England is not the 
most appropriate forum on the grounds of forum non conveniens and that the English 
court should decline jurisdiction in favour of another more appropriate forum. 69 If the 
defendant business is situated in a Member State, the ‘Brussels I Regime’ applies. 
Following its predecessor the Brussels Convention 1968, Regulation 44/2001 EC, 70 
(hereafter the Brussels I Regulation) requires that if the defendant business is not sued 
in the court of the Member State where it is situated (by virtue of Articles 2 and 60), 
then it can only be sued in the courts of another Member State by virtue of one of the 
grounds of special jurisdiction in Article 5. Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
1968 71 provided that a claim in tort could be brought in the courts of the place where 
the tort, delict or quasi-delict occurred. 72 In line with the objectives of that 
                                                 
64 P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 13th ed, (Butterworths, 
1999), p.618 et seq referring to the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
which has now been superceded by the Rome II Regulation. 
65 Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 14th ed, (Sweet and Maxwell, 2006), p.1904. 
66 North and Fawcett, note 64 supra. 
67 North and Fawcett, ibid and at p.629 vis. the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act ;  Dicey, note 65, p.1095-1906. Words italicised for emphasis. 
68 Previously Paragraph 6.20(8) CPR. 
69 Withers, note 2 ibid, p.259. 
70 ‘Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters’, 2001 OJ L12/1 (hereafter the ‘Brussels 1 
Regulation’). 
71 ‘Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’, 1978 OJ L304 (the Brussels Convention 1968). 
72 Unlike the Brussels I Regulation, it did not at that stage, apply to ‘threatened wrongs’ ; North and 
Fawcett, note 64 supra, p.215. 
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Convention,73 an autonomous, Community 74 meaning was given to the definition of a 
tort. There is authority from Garden Cottage Foods v Milk Marketing Board 75 in 
support that a claim for unfair competition constitutes the “equivalent” 76 of a tort for 
the purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(and thereby its successor the Brussels I Regulation). The focus of the Brussels I 
Regulation in allocating jurisdiction is therefore on the place where the harmful event, 
or the act of unfair competition occurred, or may occur. This is significant as far as 
unfair competition is concerned for it will determine the territorial location of the 
market (or indeed part of the market), being the place where the consumer or 
competitor sustained damage, which justifies the allocation of special jurisdiction as 
an alternative to the defendant’s domicile. In the English case Provimi Ltd v Avensis 
Animal Nutrition SA, 77 the English High Court upheld a claim in tort for damages for 
breach of competition law under Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention despite the 
existence of a jurisdiction clause in the contract between manufacturers, sellers and 
purchasers of vitamin tablets. Similar provisions in the Lugano Convention 78 were 
also considered in the Norwegian case Saba Molnlycke AS v Proctor and Gamble 
Scandinavia Inc. 79 In Saba, a case involving the alleged misleading advertising of 
nappies, the Norwegian Court of Appeal held that damage could include “non-
physical” 80 damage such as unfair - or as the court termed it “improper or disloyal” 81  
- competition irrespective of where the defendant company was situated. More 
recently, the English High Court held that as no damage had accrued in England, the 
English court could not take jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation. The court in SanDisk Corp referred to earlier authority from the European 
                                                 
73 LTU v Eurocontrol C29/76 [1976] ECR 1541. 
74 Kalfelis v Schroeder C189/87 [1988] ECR 5565. 
75 Garden Cottage Foods v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130 ; see also North and Fawcett, note 64 
supra, p.621 (despite the authors’ acknowledgement that the Law Commission’s 1984 Working Paper 
did not think it was clear whether unfair competition would be classified as tortuous ; ibid). 
76 North and Fawcett, ibid. 
77 Provimi Ltd v Avensis Animal Nutrition SA [2003] EWCH 961 (Comm). 
78 A parallel Convention to the 1968 Convention which operates between EFTA states ; the Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done at Lugano, 
16 December 1988 (the Lugano Convention), OJ 1988 L319/9. The most recent version can be found at 
OJ 2007 L339/3.  
79 Saba Molnlycke AS v Proctor and Gamble Scandinavia Inc [1997] I L Pr 704 ; J.J. Fawcett and J.M. 
Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett Private International Law, 14th ed, (OUP, 2007),  p.247. 
80 Saba Molnlycke AS, ibid, p.709. 
81 Saba Molnlycke AS, ibid. 
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Court of Justice in Dumez France SA v Hessische Landesbank 82 and the English High 
Court in Domicrest v Swiss Bank Corp. 83 which both held that the place where the 
damage originates forms the basis of a claim under Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention. In this respect, Withers’ assessment of the ‘place where the harmful 
event occurred’ and his analogy with the ECJ’s reasoning in Shevill v Press Alliance 
84 are instructive. Withers is correct in his view that it is the place where the anti-
competitive behaviour de facto occurred that establishes jurisdiction as opposed to the 
place where any illicit agreement was entered into or adverse economic consequences 
occurred. 85 Withers considered how the place where an agreement to undertake anti-
competitive behaviour is colluded between competitors can often be a distinct place 
(or territory) from the place where the anti-competitive behaviour actually occurred. 
Furthermore, the anti-competitive behaviour alleged can occur in multiple 
jurisdictions - reflecting market conditions - a concern echoed by Dickinson and 
Fitchen in their assessments of Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation. Relying on 
Shevill - as Withers does ‘by analogy’ 86 - opens up the possibility for consumers to 
sue either where the business is situated or in the courts of the place where the 
harmful event occurred. However, the consequence of this approach is the 
fragmentation, or ‘Mosaikbetrachtung,’ 87 of claims in different jurisdictions and the 
increased expense to consumers and their representatives in pursuing claims for 
damages in multiple jurisdictions.  
 
Similar concerns have been echoed regarding classification and location of the tort for 
the purposes of ascertaining the applicable law. Prior to the Rome II Regulation, the 
applicable law rules for the majority of cross-border torts (excluding defamation) 
were to be found in the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995, sections 11 (as the general rule) and 12 (as the exception) . Under Section 11 of 
the 1995 Act, the applicable law was the law of the place where the tort occurred 
                                                 
82 Dumez France SA v Hessische Landesbank (220/88) [1990] E.C.R. I-49 – most recently considered 
in a dispute alleging loss by unfair means of a licensing agreement in Future Investments SA v 
Federation Internationale de Football Association [2010] EWHC 1019 (Ch). 
83 Domicrest v Swiss Bank Corp [1999] QB 548. 
84 Shevill v Press Alliance SA C-68/93 [1995] ECR I-415. 
85 Withers, note 2 ibid, p.261. 
86 Withers, ibid. 
87 See further on this Fitchen, note 8 supra. 
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(whether in a single country (s.11(1)) or in different countries (s.11(2) 88). Section 
11(2)(c) applied  ‘the law of the country in which the most significant element or 
elements of those events occurred’  to economic torts, including those ‘unknown to 
English law.’ 89 The concern as to how an English court was to consider the approach 
of a foreign law in classifying such a tort has not necessarily been removed by the 
introduction of Article 6 of Rome II. Furthermore, in the absence of guidance from 
the ECJ, it may be some time before the connecting factors in Articles 6(1) and (3) 
can be interpreted with certainty. 
 
THE ROME II REGULATION 
 
The Communitarisation of choice of law rules for non-contractual obligations is the 
most recent illustration of Treaty objectives 90 for ‘promoting the compatibility of the 
rules applicable in the Member States concerning the conflicts of laws and of 
jurisdiction.’ 91 On 11 January 2009, Regulation 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to 
Non-Contractual Obligations (hereafter the Rome II Regulation) came into force 
across the Community (with the exception of Denmark). The Rome II Regulation 
provides freedom for the parties to select the applicable law governing a ‘non-
contractual obligation’ that falls within the scope of the Regulation. However, such 
freedom is excluded from claims made under Article 6. 92 Stone regarded the Rome II 
Regulation proposal as a welcome development in regulating the ‘three-dimensional 
function of competition law … in a modern conflict-of-laws instrument.’ 93  
 
Recital (6) of the Rome II Regulation states that ‘(T)he proper functioning of the 
internal market creates a need, in order to improve the predictability of the outcome of 
litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of judgments, for 
the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate the same national law 
                                                 
88 Section 11(2)(c) for ‘economic’ torts such as unfair competition. 
89 Cheshire and North, note 64 supra, p.637. 
90 Articles 61 and 65(b) EC. 
91 Recital 2, Rome II Regulation. 
92 By virtue of Article 6(4). Dickinson helpfully suggests that Article 14 might still be able to apply in 
situations involving a specific competitor (ie by virtue of Article 6(2) and Article 4) ; note 36 supra, 
p.426. The European Court of Justice’s approach to Articles 6(2) and (4) is awaited. 
93 P. Stone, EU Private International Law, (Edward Elgar, 2006), p.365. 
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irrespective of the Member State in which the claim is brought.’ 94  In general, Article 
3 specifies that the Rome II Regulation has universal application which means that it 
applies regardless of the situation giving rise to the non-contractual obligation (the 
example given earlier about the place where the illicit agreement took place) and the 
obligation itself has any connection with an EU Member State. However, as will be 
seen with the specific rule for competition law, there has to have been an infringing 
act in the Member State, for example an act restricting competition in Article 6(3). 
This means there is no need for a party to be domiciled or resident in an EU Member 
State, the only connection for jurisdiction deemed necessary is that the dispute can be 
tried in a court of an EU Member State, which as we have seen could be either under 
Article 2 or Article 5 of the Brussels I Regulation. 95  
 
The Rome II Regulation applies to situations involving ‘a conflict of laws, to non-
contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.’ In determining what 
constitutes a conflict of laws (a dispute with a foreign element), the Rome II 
Regulation is to be given an autonomous interpretation. Under English law, foreign 
law must be pleaded and proved by the party wishing to rely on it. 96 The European 
Court of Justice is authorised to give Preliminary Rulings on the interpretation of acts 
of the EU and, akin to the Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation, this extends 
to Preliminary Rulings on the Rome II Regulation.  The English courts must therefore 
act in accordance with either decisions from or principles set down by the European 
Court of Justice.  One of the key concepts is the meaning of ‘non-contractual 
obligations.’ 97 Before determining the applicable law under the Rome II Regulation, 
as we have seen briefly with jurisdiction, it is first necessary to characterise or classify 
the legal nature of the dispute according to whether the non-contractual obligation 
alleged to have been breached is as a result of a breach of a tort, unjust enrichment, 
negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo. Each Member State has its own definition 
                                                 
94 Recital 6, Rome II Regulation. 
95 Or alternatively, if there is more than one defendant, Article 6. 
96 A challenge highlighted by Dickinson (note 36 supra, pp.418-426) when applying more than one 
applicable law under Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
97 If there was concurrent liability in contract and tort, it would be classified as a contractual liability; a 
point applied in the jurisdictional context in Source v TUV [1998] QB 54. However, according to 
Cheshire and North the better approach, despite the recent introduction of the Regulation and no 
authority in support, is that a tortuous classification is applied when operating the Regulation since 
“The Regulation envisages that there can be a tortuous obligation in the situation where the parties 
have a pre-existing contractual relationship and there can be a tortuous obligation to which there is a 
contractual defence,”  ; Fawcett and Carutthers, note 79 supra, p.779. 
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of what constitutes a non-contractual obligation and it is therefore unfortunate that 
Recital 11 the Regulation offers limited guidance.  Obligations that are non-
contractual, and otherwise not excluded in Article 1(2), are to be defined in a positive 
way in the same way as Article 5(3) of the Brussels 1 Regulation.  Like Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels 1 Regulation, the Rome II Regulation also applies to threatened wrongs. 
Damage is defined under Article 2(1) as ‘any consequence arising out of a tort/delict 
…’ It has been suggested by Cheshire and North that this should be taken as direct 
damage, following a consistent approach with the Brussels 1 Regulation. 98 
Furthermore, earlier concerns about what constitutes ‘damage’ 99 have  - to some 
extent - been removed by Article 15 of the Rome II Regulation which determines, 
inter alia, the substance and procedural aspects of a non-contractual obligation 
including the basis of liability, grounds for exemption of liability, the assessment of 
damages and the remedy claimed. Danov maintains that irrespective of Article 15 the 
effect of both Recital 32 and Article 21 may render invalid any claim for punitive or 
exemplary damages applicable under the lex loci delicti that would be incompatible 
with the public interest of the forum. 100Whilst the desire to ensure consistency and 
predictability via the applicable law will not be at the cost of offending the public 
policy of the forum, public policy is likely to be rarely invoked. 
 
Recital 14 of the Rome II Regulation states that the connecting factors contained in 
the Regulation “are the most appropriate to achieve (the) objectives of legal certainty 
and justice in individual cases.” 101 It is these connecting factors that are crucial in 
determining the basis upon which Articles 4 and 6 operate and, indeed, interact with 
each other.  
 
ARTICLE 4 - THE GENERAL APPLICABLE LAW RULE 
The general choice of law rule in the Regulation is provided in Article 4. Article 4 is 
designed to protect the individual party in a dispute where a non-contractual 
                                                 
98 Fawcett and Carutthers, ibid, pp.797-798. Cf Dickinson, note 36 supra, p.397-398 who suggests that 
that the concept of damage under Article 6(1) and 6(3) is distinct from Article 5(3) of Regulation 
44/2001 (the Brussels I Regulation) and, depending on the interpretation of Recital 21, could lead to an 
inconsistent application of jurisdiction and applicable law rules in determining whether damage has 
occurred in an unfair competition case. 
99 See further Danov, note 35 supra. 
100 Danov, ibid, p.432 et seq. 
101 Words modified and added for syntax. 
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obligation has been breached. It contains a general choice of law principle, an 
exception to that general principle and an escape clause, as follows.  Article 4(1) 
states that the applicable law is the law of the country where the damage occurred.  As 
with jurisdiction rules, the emphasis is to establish the lex causae of a territorial unit. 
Furthermore, the lex causae is not the law of the place where the indirect 
consequences of damage are felt. It is necessary therefore to determine the lex loci 
delicti commissi – specifically the lex damni – the place where the damage occurs, 
which can often be different to the place in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred. The exception is to be found in Article 4(2) which applies to ‘internal’ 
disputes, that is where both parties have the same habitual residence 102 when the 
dispute arises, that law will apply. The ‘escape clause’ is provided by Article 4(3) 
which requires a manifestly more closely connected country to be established for its 
laws to apply instead. Like Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention 1980, Article 4(3) is 
intended to take into account the law that reflects the ‘centre of gravity’ of the dispute. 
The ‘high threshold’ 103 required for the application of Article 4(3) was recently 
considered, and specifically rejected, by the English High Court in Jacobs v MIB.104  
 
ARTICLE 6 - THE LAW APPLICABLE TO UNFAIR COMPETITION AND 
ACTS RESTRICTING COMPETITION  
Dickinson reminds us of the Commission’s position on Article 6(1) and (2) when 
states that the ‘act of unfair competition, the defendant’s conduct must have some 
impact upon relations between the participants in a particular market, whether 
horizontally (between competitors) or vertically (as against consumers 
collectively).’105 When considering Article 6, it is useful to take as a starting point 
Recital 13 which states that, ‘(U)niform rules applied irrespective of the law they 
designate may avert the risk of distortions of competition between Community 
litigants’ 106 and Recital 19 which provides that ‘(S)pecific rules should be laid down 
for special torts/delicts where the general rule does not allow a reasonable balance to 
                                                 
102 The Regulation omits a definition of where a business is located for the same purpose. 
103 Fawcett and Carutthers, note 79 supra, p.799. 
104 Jacobs v Motor Insurers Bureau [2010] EWHC 231 (QB). 
105 Dickinson, note 36 supra, p.403 
106 Recital 13, Rome II Regulation. 
19 
 
be struck between the interests at stake.’ 107  The Commission commented on the draft 
Regulation to the effect that Article 6 was designed to  
correspond to the victim’s expectations, since the rule generally designates the 
law governing their economic environment. But it also secures equal treatment 
for all operators on the same market.  The purpose of competition law is to 
protect a market; it pursues a macro-economic objective. 108 
 
As Dickinson has observed vis-à-vis Recital 21, ‘the special rule in Article 6 is not an 
exception to the general rule in Article 4(1) but rather a clarification of it.’ 109 The 
dual purpose of the ‘effects test’ 110 approach used to determine the applicable law 
rules for unfair competition is a ‘market-orientated’ 111 choice of law rule designed to 
provide protection for ‘competitors, consumers and the general public’ 112 and 
facilitate the proper economic functioning of the EU market.  Dickinson maintains 
however that the net effect is that the applicable law rules in Article 6 are ‘sufficiently 
independent of the general rule for torts to be characterized as special rules in their 
own right.’ 113  Indeed, this would reflect the aim of the Regulation to provide a 
‘flexible framework of conflict-of-laws rules [and] to enable the court seized to treat 
individual cases in an appropriate manner.’ 114  With the aims of the Regulation and 
Recital 14 in mind, Article 6 provides the following choice of law rules. 115 
 
1. (T)he law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of an act of 
unfair competition shall be the law of the country where competitive relations 
or the collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected. 
2. Where an act of unfair competition affects exclusively the interests of a specific 
competitor, Article 4 shall apply. 
3. (a) The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
restriction of competition shall be the law of the country where the market is, 
or is likely to be, affected. 
Where the market is, or is likely to be, affected in more than one country, the 
person seeking compensation for damage who sues in the court of the domicile of 
the defendant, may instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court 
seised, provided that the market in that Member State is amongst those directly 
                                                 
107 Recital 19, Rome II Regulation. 
108 EU Commission, cited by Stone, note 93 supra, p.365 and Dickinson, note 36 supra, p.412. 
109 Recital 21, Rome II Regulation; Dickinson, note 36 supra, p.397. 
110 Recital 22, Rome II Regulation refers to the ‘law of the country where the market is, or is likely to 
be, affected in more than one country …’ An approach endorsed by Withers, note 2 supra. 
111 Dickinson, note 36 supra, p.405. 
112 Recital 21, Rome II Regulation. 
113 Dickinson, note 36 supra, p.397. 
114 Recital 14, Rome II Regulation.  
115 Words in bold for emphasis. Article 6(2) is not considered here. 
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and substantially affected by the restriction in competition out of which the non-
contractual obligation on which the claim is based arises; where the claimant sues, 
in accordance with the applicable rules on jurisdiction, more than one defendant in 
that court, he or she can only choose to base his or her claim on the law of that 
court if the restriction in competition on which the claim against each of these 
defendants relies directly and substantially affects also the market in the Member 
State of that court. 
4. The law applicable under this Article may not be derogated from by an 
agreement pursuant to Article 14. 116 
 
Some of the key concepts of Article 6, namely ‘unfair competition,’ the ‘affected 
market,’ the effect on the market that justifies the application of Article 6(1) and the 
exception in Article 6(3), will now be considered. The lack of a clear definition of 
‘unfair competition’ was acknowledged by the Wallis Report 117 during the drafting 
process of the Regulation.118 Essentially, as the Commission and Dickinson have both 
observed, the conduct must affect more than one participant in the marketplace (vis. 
‘participants’) or the ‘derogation’ 119 in Article 6(2) will operate with the effect that 
the applicable law will instead be determined by Article 4.120 Whilst this may appear 
to provide a neat solution, the Commission acknowledged the lack of consistency in 
the connecting factors used in Articles 4 and 6.121  Nevertheless, Dickinson has 
helpfully suggested that for the purposes of Article 6, unfair competition under 
English law could encompass the torts of ‘passing off, malicious falsehood […] in 
comparative advertising, and actions by a non-public body […] under Part 8 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002 …’ 122 Of these, the first two could have a direct and detrimental 
impact upon consumers in the market.  
 
Second, the objective of Article 6(1) is to protect claimants in the affected market. 
However a key criticism of the Regulation is that it does not provide a definition of 
the ‘affected market’ as a connecting factor. It is submitted that it given the scope of 
application of Article 6 – horizontal or vertical anti-competitive behaviour – a 
definition from the European Court of Justice could be helpful. If it was defined, it 
must first be done for the purposes of private international law. Furthermore, it may 
                                                 
116 Article 6, Rome II Regulation. Words in bold for emphasis. 
117 Stone, note 93 supra, p.366. 
118 Dickinson, note 36 supra, p.403. Word italicised for emphasis. 
119 Dickinson, ibid, p.405. Words omitted for syntax. 
120 Dickinson, ibid, p.397. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Dickinson, ibid, p.404. 
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have to be distinguished depending on the direction of the behaviour in dispute. In 
response, Dickinson has explored the narrower and wider meanings that could be 
attributed to the ‘affected market’, namely a market restricted to a single country or 
area (used more generally in competition law) or a wider concept of affected market 
where claims can be brought either by competitors or consumers.123 Dickinson 
considers the potential application of a ‘qualified affected market’ 124 approach to 
encompass not just competitors but also consumers and their collective 
representatives who have been affected by anti-competitive behaviour within a 
particular area (as opposed to the entire marketplace).125 By that it is assumed that 
the damage must be attributable to consumers or their representatives in a particular 
territorial unit or jurisdiction, for it is the law of that place which will apply in a claim 
brought in the court of a Member State under Article 6. Support for this approach was 
illustrated by analogous rules in the Brussels I Regulation considered earlier.  Third, 
the required ‘effect’ on the market must be sufficiently, or causally, material to justify 
the application of Article 6. Dickinson has suggested, in line with earlier authority 
from the Wood Pulp case, 126 that the anti-competitive arrangement must have been 
‘implemented’ within the Community, as opposed to quantifying a ‘direct and 
sufficient effect’ for the same purpose. Support for this view can also be drawn from 
Withers’ analogy referred to earlier vis-a-vis distinguishing between the lex causae 
and the lex damni for the purposes of allocating jurisdiction for a cross-border tort. 
However the potential fragmentation of proceedings is increased as a result. 
Therefore, it must be shown that for Article 6 to apply anti-competitive behaviour and 
damage occurred in a particular territorial unit (jurisdiction) for the purposes of 
ascertaining the applicable law. 
 
The applicable law rules for disputes as a result of a restriction of competition are 
contained in Article 6(3) and are deemed ‘mutually exclusive’ from the applicable law 
rules for unfair competition under Article 6(1). 127 A restriction of competition is 
defined in Recital (23) as applying to  
 
                                                 
123 Dickinson, ibid, p.413-414. 
124 Dickinson, ibid, p.414-415. 
125 Dickinson, ibid, p.414. 
126 [1988] ECR 5193. 
127 Dickinson, ibid, p.418.  On Article 6(3), see generally Fitchen, note 8 supra. 
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prohibitions on agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within a Member State or 
within the internal market, as well as prohibitions on the abuse of a 
dominant position within a Member State or within the internet market, 
where such agreements, decisions, concerted practices or abuses are prohibited 
by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty or by the law of a Member State. 128 
 
The implications of more than one applicable law applying as a result of Article 6(3) 
are apparent, particularly where more than one national market is or is likely to be 
affected by the restrictive behaviour. A key challenge of the Regulation will be to 
determine the ‘affected market(s)’ for the purposes of Article 6(3). As we have seen, 
the most effective starting point for the purposes of private international law is to 
determine the geographical location of the parties’ activities in order to localise the 
dispute with a particular jurisdiction. Dickinson argues that whilst it may be necessary 
to consider a sub-category of connecting factors including, but not restricted to, such 
matters as national measures imposing barriers to trade, language and cultural 
differences, the views of market participants and differences in pricing,129 such a 
‘legal-economic analysis of this kind […] is one of the least satisfactory aspects of the 
Rome II Regulation,’ 130 and one that would probably have a prohibitive effect on 
litigation than facilitating predictability and certainty of result. In any event, an 
analogy with the European Commission’s Statement on Article 15 and 73 of the 
Brussels I Regulation reminds us that language and currency were not deemed 
relevant considerations for the purposes of establishing whether a business directed its 
commercial activities towards a consumer’s jurisdiction via a web site. However, 
perhaps Article 6(3) is simply concerned with distinguishing between disputes 
internal to each Member State, 131 disputes where agreement or collusion regarding 
anti-competitive behaviour originated outside the EU but the behaviour itself occurred 
in a Member State and disputes between parties situated in different Member States. 
In any event, the ethos of choice of law rules is to ascertain the law of a territory 
which will then govern the dispute. Aside from determining the ‘affected market’ for 
                                                 
128 Recital 23, Rome II Regulation. Words in bold for emphasis. 
129 Dickinson, ibid, p.422-423. 
130 Dickinson, ibid. 
131 Disputes between different parts of a Member State may still require reference to rules of private 
international law as they operate between those parts, eg. a dispute between parties situated in England 
and Scotland. 
23 
 
the purposes of Article 6(3), it will also be necessary to determine the point in time 
when the restriction of competition occurred in the marketplace. 
 
As an alternative to the law(s) of the affected market(s), the claimant can select the 
law of the forum (lex fori) under Article 6(3) provided that there is more than one 
country ‘directly and substantially affected’ by the implementation of the restrictive 
practice and the defendant is domiciled in the Member State of the lex fori. Whilst at 
first hand this escape clause might seem advantageous to a claimant, the absence of a 
clear definition of what constitutes a “direct and substantial” effect in the market of 
the lex fori could place an additional hurdle for the claimant to satisfy. A collective 
representative action on behalf of consumers could satisfy such a requirement. In any 
event the necessity for such a requirement is questioned given that if the claimant was 
to sue in the courts of the defendant’s domicile under Article 2 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, the lex fori would apply. The defendant is already protected on the basis 
of actor sequitur forum rei, so the additional requirement appears unduly burdensome 
on a claimant. 
 
THE PROPOSAL FOR AN EU CONSUMER COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
MECHANISM 
In November 2008, the European Commission released a Green Paper on ‘Consumer 
Collective Redress.’ 132 The Green Paper outlines how the Commission seeks to 
consider ‘options to close any gaps to effective redress’ in both national and cross-
border disputes with sellers especially when consumers are ‘affected by the same 
legal infringement.’ 133  According to Micklitz, Reich and Rott, the three bases for 
‘improv(ing) collective consumer protection is …either … internal market 
competence … on Article 153(3)(b) in supporting Member States’ measures …[or]… 
the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty on judicial cooperation in civil matters.’ 134 
As stated earlier, in accordance with Courage and Manfredi, the right to take action 
for breach of competition laws is permissible under Community law. Nevertheless, 
perhaps crucially, the ‘procedural features, as well as the determination of the 
                                                 
132 EU Commission, ‘Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress’, (COM 2008 794 Final). 
133 Green Paper, ibid, p.3, para.4. 
134 Micklitz, Reich, Rott, note 33 supra, p.351. 
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competent court, are subject to national law.’ 135 Accordingly, the precursor to 
effective private enforcement for breach of competition law rules is the ability of 
consumers to be able to collectively take action to via such a collective redress 
procedure facilitated by a Member State. When referring to collective redress, we are 
concerned here with an additional basis of private judicial redress by individuals and 
their representatives, not Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 136  
 
The inherent ‘success rate’ of Article 6 of Rome II, as Fitchen remarks, will depend 
upon the ‘interaction, in the text, of competing policies which have influenced the 
Commission’s desire [for] reform of private enforcement…’ 137 As far as the EU 
Consumer Protection Policy is concerned, the requirement for Member States to 
provide ‘effective proceedings’ has existed for over three decades. 138 As far as 
collective redress is concerned, Hodges has remarked that three key issues arise: 
(shared) competence, the capacity of representatives to take action and mutual 
recognition  139 leading towards effective enforcement. In accordance with Article 4 
TFEU, the EU only has competence to take measures for collective redress - as 
Hodges correctly asserts - if the ‘objectives [have not or] cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States’ 140 (ie. subsidiarity) and ‘measures at EU level must 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objects at which they are directed 
[proportionality].’ 141 Furthermore, in the context of cross-border disputes, the 
Member States’ ‘procedural autonomy’ 142 must also be respected, since Article 81 
TFEU (ex Article 65 EC) ‘requires evidence of cross-border matters and might … 
justify only cross-border measures.’ 143  In that regard, the current position of 
collective redress across the Member States is instructive. The legal basis as far as 
consumers are concerned is Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 95 EC) which requires 
                                                 
135 Micklitz, Reich, Rott, ibid, p.337. 
136 Indeed, Micklitz Reich and Rott confirm in their opinion that the Community does not have 
competence in the area of ADR; ibid at p.342. As traditional and Communitarised private international 
laws provides rules for the determination of jurisdiction, choice of law and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, the use of ADR (however defined) as a means of facilitating collective consumer redress 
may be harder to justify. 
137 Fitchen, note 8, p.343. 
138 Micklitz, Reich, Rott, note 33 supra, p.342. 
139 C. Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems, (Hart, 
2008), p.96. 
140 Hodges, ibid, p.93, 103 ; words in brackets added. 
141 Hodges, ibid. 
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143 Hodges, ibid, p.94. 
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consumers to be provided with a high level of protection. In accordance with Article 4 
TFEU, the continued sharing of competence in the field of consumer protection will 
heavily impact upon any EU-wide collective redress mechanism. 144 A recent paper 
by Fairgreave and Howells highlights the inherent challenges posed by shared 
competence. These authors suggest that ‘national reform’145 is the most likely 
outcome for claims already viable under national law. Alternatively, at best the 
mechanism could facilitate the resolution of otherwise ‘non-viable consumer 
claims’146 such as claims for damages for anti-competitive behaviour. Provided the 
Community has competence to instigate and enforce consumer collective redress in 
respect of the latter claims, the proposal would be a first, in that it would extend the 
principle of subsidiarity by providing the first cross-border basis for implementing, or 
enforcing,147 collective redress via the Rome II Regulation.  As far as consumer law is 
concerned, Directives have traditionally facilitated consumer collective redress 
mechanisms by permitting Member States to implement such measures over and 
above the minimum required by EU law. The legal basis that a future collective 
redress mechanism will take (whether a Regulation or Directive) and its remit (that is, 
depending on the viability of the claim) are both crucial to achieving the objective of 
mutual recognition. If implemented as a Regulation, and in combination with the 
“maximisation” of consumer protection policy, such a collective redress mechanism 
would complement existing national collective redress procedures where they exist. A 
Directive would not meet the objectives of maximising consumer protection across 
the Community.  
 
The Green Paper considered four options for the development of collective redress at 
Community level; no action; cooperation between the Member States; a mix of policy 
instruments with a heavy reliance on ADR; and judicial collective redress. The first 
has been dismissed as it would not meet Treaty obligations in ensuring consumers are 
provided with maximum protection. The second option is also not being pursued as 
the cooperation mechanism required between the Member States could be at odds 
with existing national measures and, in any event, top-down regulation would still be 
required. The third option has also been excluded, primarily because of the infancy of 
                                                 
144 See generally Fairgreave and Howells, note 2 supra. 
145 Fairgreave and Howells, ibid, p.379. 
146 Fairgreave and Howells, ibid. 
147 Hodges, note 139 supra, p.103. 
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ADR and wider issues of competence. 148 Accordingly, the current status of the 
proposal for an EU Collective Redress Mechanism has taken the fourth option, 
specifically a test case procedure in one Member State (ie by a consumer 
representative) followed up by individual action in other Member States. In practice, 
as currently proposed, it could be possible for consumer representatives to sue via a 
test case procedure the offending business where the defendant is located (Article 2, 
Brussels I) in order that a claim for all of the damage (Article 6(1), Rome II) could be 
sought. Thereafter, consumers could sue in any of the places where damage occurred 
by virtue of Article 5(3) of Brussels I, thereby enabling the law of that place to apply 
in accordance with Article 6(1) of Rome II.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In 2002 Withers remarked that  
(I)t remains uncertain whether the requisite elements (both procedural and 
substantive) of a claim for breach of Community competition rules are 
destined to be determined by Community law, rather than national law. 149 
 
This paper has sought to briefly explore some of the issues raised by the specific 
applicable law rules for unfair competition and acts restricting free competition in the 
new Rome II Regulation on non-contractual obligations. Although the rules are 
drafted in such terms as to ensure that commercial entities and final end-user/private 
consumers (or their representatives) can claim damages for anti-competitive 
behaviour or an act restricting competition, a number of key concepts under Article 6 
have not been sufficiently defined. Until such time that judicial guidance is provided 
by the ECJ, Article 6 will present challenges for private litigants who seek to utilise 
the EU’s efforts to communitarise conflict of laws rules for anti-competitive 
behaviour and acts restricting competition. Furthermore, a key strength of Article 6 of 
Rome II is the ability of consumer representatives to claim damages on behalf of 
consumers. As far as Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation is concerned, the proposed 
EU Consumer Collective Redress mechanism must therefore seek to address what 
Hodges identifies as the ‘real issue’ vis-à-vis effective collective redress namely, 
                                                 
148 See Micklitz, Reich and Rott, note 33 supra. 
149 Withers, note 2 ibid, p.253. 
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 first […] to deliver rectification of market imbalances: secondly, to deliver 
compensation when due; thirdly, [control] behaviour and; and fourthly, to 
enhance the economy. 150 
 
                                                 
150 Hodges, note 139 supra, p.248. Word added for syntax. 
